A detailed CIA study of the 1962 Sino-Indian war made several damning observations
Here are some of secret observations from CIA Files:
* "From the start, the Chinese leaders seem to have recognized that India was neither by temperament nor capability a military threat to their border."
* During Chinese premier Chou En Lai's 1954 India visit, the Indian leadership effectively countered the Chinese line. Responding to China's criticism of India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama, Finance Minister Morarji Desai told Chou: "You should be the last person to object to political asylum. Where would you be today if political asylum had not been given to Lenin?" And when Chou told Vice President Radhakrishnan that he could not convince "the Chinese people that Ladakh and the Aksai Plain in particular did not belong to them because of the legends going back to the 12th century which supported Chinese claims," Radhakrishnan retorted that "on such a basis India could claim Kandahar, Kabul, and many other areas including parts of China."
* "Had it not been Nehru, but rather a more military-minded man who occupied the post of prime minister in late October 1959, a priority program to prepare India eventually to fight would have been started."
* "In the course of two months [in October 59], India had been humiliated by two military defeats and the public and government officials had been aroused to anger against the nation's enemy as never before in its short history. But Nehru insisted that war with China was out of the question, and apparently did not think the challenge justified the economic burden of increased military spending."
* Dwelling on the Chinese attack, the study said that "the Chinese leaders seem to have been motivated by one primary consideration and several secondary ones in their decision to attack Indian forces.... The primary reason reflected their view that the Indian leaders had to be shown once and for all that China would not tolerate any strategy to 'recover' border territory. In clearing away Indian border posts and routing Indian troops in two key sectors, the Chinese conducted what has been called a 'punitive' expedition to chastise the Indian leaders for past and intended moveups."
* "Among the secondary reasons for attacking, a desire to damage Nehru's prestige by exposing India's weakness apparently ranked high in the Chinese leaders' order of priority. Nehru's prestige was considerable in Asia; it was being used by New Delhi to compete with Peiping [Beijing] for influence among leaders of the emerging nations. New Delhi's publicly expressed contempt for the 'great power' status of China and the disrespectful behavior of a militarily inferior power (India) was more intolerable to the Chinese leaders than that of a militarily superior power (the US)."
* "The Director of Pakistan's Ministry of External Affairs, Mohammed Yunis, told an American official in Karachi on 4 February 1962 that regarding his government's policy toward Peiping [Beijing], the principle of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' applies."
* "From the start, the Chinese leaders seem to have recognized that India was neither by temperament nor capability a military threat to their border."
* During Chinese premier Chou En Lai's 1954 India visit, the Indian leadership effectively countered the Chinese line. Responding to China's criticism of India granting asylum to the Dalai Lama, Finance Minister Morarji Desai told Chou: "You should be the last person to object to political asylum. Where would you be today if political asylum had not been given to Lenin?" And when Chou told Vice President Radhakrishnan that he could not convince "the Chinese people that Ladakh and the Aksai Plain in particular did not belong to them because of the legends going back to the 12th century which supported Chinese claims," Radhakrishnan retorted that "on such a basis India could claim Kandahar, Kabul, and many other areas including parts of China."
* "Had it not been Nehru, but rather a more military-minded man who occupied the post of prime minister in late October 1959, a priority program to prepare India eventually to fight would have been started."
* "In the course of two months [in October 59], India had been humiliated by two military defeats and the public and government officials had been aroused to anger against the nation's enemy as never before in its short history. But Nehru insisted that war with China was out of the question, and apparently did not think the challenge justified the economic burden of increased military spending."
* Dwelling on the Chinese attack, the study said that "the Chinese leaders seem to have been motivated by one primary consideration and several secondary ones in their decision to attack Indian forces.... The primary reason reflected their view that the Indian leaders had to be shown once and for all that China would not tolerate any strategy to 'recover' border territory. In clearing away Indian border posts and routing Indian troops in two key sectors, the Chinese conducted what has been called a 'punitive' expedition to chastise the Indian leaders for past and intended moveups."
* "Among the secondary reasons for attacking, a desire to damage Nehru's prestige by exposing India's weakness apparently ranked high in the Chinese leaders' order of priority. Nehru's prestige was considerable in Asia; it was being used by New Delhi to compete with Peiping [Beijing] for influence among leaders of the emerging nations. New Delhi's publicly expressed contempt for the 'great power' status of China and the disrespectful behavior of a militarily inferior power (India) was more intolerable to the Chinese leaders than that of a militarily superior power (the US)."
* "The Director of Pakistan's Ministry of External Affairs, Mohammed Yunis, told an American official in Karachi on 4 February 1962 that regarding his government's policy toward Peiping [Beijing], the principle of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' applies."
Comments
Post a Comment